

2020 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES


TACKLING SOCIAL NORMS

A game changer for gender inequalities



*Empowered lives.
Resilient nations.*





The substantive content in this publication is based on research for the 2019 *Human Development Report*. The team that created this report includes Pedro Conceição, Jon Hall, Yu-Chieh Hsu, Admir Jahic, Milorad Kovacevic, Tanni Mukhopadhyay, Anna Ortubia, Carolina Rivera and Heriberto Tapia. Contributors to the research are acknowledged at <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-report-2019-acknowledgements>.

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Human Development Perspectives

Tackling social norms—a game changer for gender inequalities

Gender disparities are a persistent form of inequality in every country.¹ Despite remarkable progress in some areas, no country in the world—rich or poor—has achieved gender equality. All too often, women and girls are discriminated against in health, in education, at home and in the labour market—with negative repercussions for their freedoms.

This is the time for a reality check. The commemoration of the 25th anniversary of the adoption of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (Beijing+25) provides an opportunity to reassess the path to gender equality and adjust actions to close gender gaps.

The world is not on track to achieve gender equality by 2030. The Human Development Report's Gender Inequality Index (GII)—a measure of women's empowerment in health, education and economic status—shows that overall progress in gender inequality has been slowing in recent years.² For instance, based on current trends, it would take 257 years to close the gender gap in economic opportunity.³ The number of female heads of government is lower today than five years ago, with only 10 women in such positions among 193 countries (down from 15 in 2014).⁴

Beyond what is measured, there are unaccounted burdens behind the achievements: the double shift at home, the harassment in public transportation, the discrimination in workplaces, and the multiple hidden constraints that women face.

New social movements are emerging all around the world. Different forms of demonstration—including online campaigns, women marches and street performances—demand new ways of looking at gender equality and women's empowerment. The #MeToo movement gives voice to many silence breakers, uncovering abuse and vulnerability. In India the #IWillGoOut movement demands equal rights for women in public spaces.⁵ In Latin America the #NiUnaMenos movement sheds light on femicides and violence against

women from Argentina to Mexico.⁶ A movement born in Chile created a hymn named “a rapist in your way,” shouted in unison by thousands of women across the world (367 times in 52 countries and on every continent except Antarctica⁷) demanding that society stop blaming the victims of rape.

Why is progress towards some aspects of gender equality getting slower and more difficult? Are there hidden dimensions of gender inequality? To explore these questions, the 2019 *Human Development Report* argues that progress towards gender equality is confronting moving targets and inequality traps, with disadvantaged groups catching up with basic achievements, but trailing in more empowering enhanced achievements. One example: In the 50 countries where adult women are more educated than men, they still receive on average 39 percent less income than men—despite devoting more time to work.⁸

Social norms are central to the understanding of these dynamics. For example, societies often tell their girls that they can become anything they want and are capable of, while investing in their education. But the same societies tend to block their access to power positions without giving them a fair chance. Globally almost 50 percent of people say they think men make better political leaders, while more than 40 percent feel that men make better business executives—a social judgement, just for being a woman, an invisible barrier and an affront to fairness and real meritocracy.⁹

The situation of women: an inequality plateau?

There has been remarkable progress on gender equality. Over the past century, women in most countries were granted basic political, economic and social rights.¹⁰ Restrictions to vote, go to school and work in different economic areas were lifted, with the principle of equality typically granted in constitutions.¹¹

A plateau in gender inequality comes with a great cost

The trend gained global momentum in the second half of the 20th century.¹²

This strong push was a basis for optimism before the turn of the 21st century. In 1995—the year of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action—the *Human Development Report* highlighted sizeable gender disparities, larger than today’s, but documented substantial progress over the preceding two decades, particularly in education and health, where the prospect of equality was visible on the near horizon. The conclusion: “These impressions are cause for hope, not pessimism, for the future.”¹³

After 1995 the situation of women continued to improve, with remarkable strides in education, almost reaching parity in average primary enrolment, and in health, reducing the global maternal mortality ratio by 45 percent after 1990.¹⁴ But gains in other dimensions of women’s empowerment have been smaller, and progress towards gender equality is slowing (figure 1). The space for gains based on current strategies may be eroding, and unless the active barriers posed by biased beliefs and practices that sustain persistent gender inequalities are addressed, progress towards equality will be far harder in the foreseeable future.


Overall, it is still the case—as Martha Nussbaum has pointed out—that “women in much of the world lack support for

fundamental functions of a human life.”¹⁵ This is evident in the Gender Inequality Index and its components—reflecting gaps in reproductive health, empowerment and the labour market. No place in the world has gender equality. In Sub-Saharan Africa 1 woman in every 180 giving birth dies (more than 20 times the rate in developed countries). And in most regions adult women are less educated, have less access to labour markets than men and lack access to political power (table 1). Moreover, gender inequality translates into other areas of human development, threatening progress across the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Gender inequality is correlated with a loss in human development due to inequality (figure 2). No country has reached low inequality in human development without reducing the loss coming from gender inequality. Investing in women’s equality and lifting both their living standards and their empowerment are thus central to the human development agenda and to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Not only are 45 targets and 54 specific indicators of the SDG framework directly linked to gender,¹⁶ the effects of these inequalities are linked to all dimensions of development.¹⁷ This implies that investment in gender equality has a catalytic effect on the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda.

FIGURE 1

Progress towards gender equality is slowing



Source: Human Development Report Office (see table A4).

TABLE 1


Gender Inequality Index: Regional dashboard

Region	Gender Inequality Index	Maternal mortality ratio (deaths per 100,000 live births)	Adolescent birth rate (births per 1,000 women ages 15–19)	Share of seats in parliament (% held by women)	Population with at least some secondary education (% ages 25 and older)		Labour force participation rate (% ages 15 and older)	
					Female	Male	Female	Male
					2010–2018	2010–2018	2018	2018
Arab States	0.531	148.2	46.6	18.3	45.9	54.9	20.4	73.8
East Asia and the Pacific	0.310	61.7	22.0	20.3	68.8	76.2	59.7	77.0
Europe and Central Asia	0.276	24.8	27.8	21.2	78.1	85.8	45.2	70.1
Latin America and the Caribbean	0.383	67.6	63.2	31.0	59.7	59.3	51.8	77.2
South Asia	0.510	175.7	26.1	17.1	39.9	60.8	25.9	78.8
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.573	550.2	104.7	23.5	28.8	39.8	63.5	72.9

Source: Human Development Report Office (see table A4).

FIGURE 2

Gender inequality is correlated with a loss in human development due to inequality



Note: Countries mapped by their Gender Inequality Index performance relative to their performance on the Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index. The higher the loss due to gender inequality, the greater the inequality in human development.
Source: Human Development Report Office.

Gender inequality and empowerment: catching up in the basics, widening gaps in enhanced capabilities

Progress in human development is linked to expanding substantive freedoms, capabilities


and functionings from the basic to the more enhanced, representing different levels of empowerment. And there has been faster progress towards equality in basic capabilities and slower progress in enhanced capabilities. Disadvantaged groups catch up in the basic and fall behind in the enhanced, a dynamic that tends to perpetuate the unequal distribution of power.¹⁸ Gender equality-related capabilities follow a similar pattern.

On the positive side women are catching up in basic areas of development. Legal barriers to gender equality have been removed in most countries: Women can vote and be elected, they have access to education, and they can increasingly participate in the economy without formal restrictions. But progress has been uneven as women move away from basic areas into enhanced ones, where gaps tend to be wider.

These patterns can be interpreted as reflecting the distribution of individual empowerment and social power. Women make greater and faster progress where their individual empowerment or social power is lower (basic capabilities). But they face a glass ceiling where they have greater responsibility, political leadership and social payoffs in markets, social life and politics (enhanced capabilities) (figure 3). This view of gradients in empowerment is closely linked to the seminal literature on basic and strategic needs coming from gender planning (box 1).

FIGURE 3

Remarkable progress in basic capabilities, much less in enhanced capabilities



Source: Human Development Report Office.

Progress has been uneven as women move away from basic areas into enhanced ones, where gaps tend to be wider

BOX 1

Practical and strategic gender interests and needs

The notion of practical and strategic gender interests and needs (pioneered by Caroline Moser),¹ which informs much of the gender policy analysis framework, is connected here to the concept of basic and enhanced capabilities and achievements. As articulated in gender social policy analyses,² practical gender needs refer to the needs of women and men to make everyday life easier, such as access to water, better transportation, childcare facilities and so on.

Addressing these needs will not directly challenge gender power relations but may remove important obstacles to women's economic empowerment. Strategic gender needs refer to needs for society to shift in

gender roles and relations, such as a law condemning gender-based violence, equal access to credit, equal inheritance and others. Addressing them should alter gender power relations. Sometimes practical and strategic needs coincide—for example, the practical need for childcare coincides with the strategic need to get a job outside the home.³ The difference is comparable to that between basic and enhanced capabilities. Transformative changes that can bring about normative and structural shifts are the strongest predictors of practical and strategic interventions expanding women's agency and empowerment for gender equality.

Notes

1. Molyneux 1985; Moser 1989. 2. Moser 1989. 3. SIDA 2015.


Take access to political participation (figure 4, left panel). Women and men vote in elections at similar rates. So, there is parity in entry-level political participation, where power is very diffused. But when more concentrated political power is at stake, women appear severely underrepresented. The higher the power and responsibility, the wider the gender gap—and

for heads of state and government it is almost 90 percent.

Similar gradients occur even for women who reach higher power. Only 24 percent of the parliamentary seats are held by women, and they represent only 5 percent of heads of government in 2019.¹⁹ And with portfolios unevenly distributed, women most commonly

FIGURE 4

The greater the empowerment, the wider the gender gap



a. Assumes an equal proportion of men and women in the voting population.

Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on data from the World Values Survey, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, ILO (2019b) and *Forbes* (2019).

held in environment, natural resources and energy, followed by social sectors, such as social affairs, education and family. Fewer women had portfolios in transport, economics or finance. Certain disciplines are typically associated with feminine or masculine characteristics, as is also true in education and the labour market.

Economic participation also shows a gradient (see figure 4, right panel). When empowerment is basic and precarious, women are overrepresented, as for contributing family workers (typically not receiving monetary payment). Then, as economic power increases from employee to employer, and from employer to top entertainer and billionaire, the gender gap widens, with women representing only 21 percent of the world’s employers and 12 percent of the top billionaires.²⁰ Empowerment gradients appear even for a set of similar companies, as with the gender leadership gap in S&P 500 companies: only 5.8 percent of CEOs are female.²¹ Although women’s overall employment by these companies might be close to parity, women are underrepresented in more senior positions.

This pattern appears in other aspects of development. Women today are the most qualified in history, and newer generations

of women have reached parity in enrolment in primary education. But this may not be enough for achieving parity in adulthood, as large differences persist in occupational choices, with the share of female graduates in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) programmes lower than 15 percent for most countries.²² The transition from the education system to the world of paid work is marked by a gender equality discontinuity associated with women’s reproductive roles.²³ Women on average comprise 43 percent of the agricultural labour force in developing countries while the share of female holders of agricultural land reaches only 18 percent.²⁴ Some discontinuities represent a natural part of the development process—the constant need to push new boundaries to achieve more. Others represent the response of deeply rooted social norms that preserve underlying structures of power.

Are social norms and power imbalances shifting?

Gender inequality has long been associated with persistent discriminatory social norms

As broader constructs, norms are operationalized through beliefs, attitudes and practices

prescribing social roles and power relations between men and women in society.²⁵ Social norms held by individuals and their reference groups are values, beliefs, attitudes and practices that assert preferred power dynamics for interactions between individuals and institutions.²⁶ As broader constructs, norms are operationalized through beliefs, attitudes and practices.²⁷

People's expectations of individuals' roles in households, communities, workplaces and societies can determine a group's functioning. Women often face strong conventional societal expectations to be caregivers and homemakers; men are expected to be breadwinners.²⁸ Embedded in these social norms are longstanding patterns of exclusion from household and community decisionmaking that limit women's opportunities and choices. So, despite convergence on some outcome indicators—such as access to education at all levels and access to health care—women and girls in many countries still cannot reach their full potential.²⁹

Beliefs about what others do and what others think a person in some reference group should do, maintained by social approval and disapproval, often guide actions in social settings.³⁰ So it is useful to measure the beliefs and attitudes that create biases and prejudices towards women's empowerment in society.

Social norms cover several aspects of an individual's identity—age, gender, ability, ethnicity, religion and so on—that are heterogeneous and multidimensional. Discriminatory social norms and stereotypes reinforce gendered identities and determine power relations that constrain women's and men's behaviour in ways that lead to inequality. Norms influence expectations for masculine and feminine behaviour considered socially acceptable or looked down on. So they directly affect individuals' choices, freedoms and capabilities.

Social norms also reflect regularities among groups of individuals. Rules of behaviour are set according to standards of behaviour or ideals attached to a group's sense of identity.³¹ Individuals have multiple social identities and behave according to identity-related ideals; they also expect others sharing a common identity to behave according to these ideals. Norms of behaviour related to these ideals affect

people's perception of themselves and others, thus engendering a sense of belonging to particular identity groups. The beliefs people hold about appropriate behaviour often determine the range of choices and preferences that they exercise—in that context norms can determine autonomy and freedom, and beliefs about social censure and reproach create barriers for individuals who transgress. For gender roles these beliefs can be particularly important in determining the freedoms and power relations with other identities—compounded when overlapping and intersecting with those of age, race and class hierarchies (box 2).

How prevalent are biases from social norms? How are they evolving? How do they affect gender equality? These are difficult questions, mainly because social norms and attitudes are hard to observe, interpret and measure. But using data from the World Values Survey wave 5 (2005–2009) and wave 6 (2010–2014), a gender social norms index can be constructed to capture how social beliefs can obstruct gender equality along multiple dimensions (figure 5).

The gender social norms index—measuring beliefs, biases and prejudices

The gender social norms index, proposed here and introduced in the 2019 *Human Development Report* for the first time, comprises four dimensions—political, educational, economic and physical integrity—and is constructed based on responses to seven questions from the World Values Survey, which are used to create seven indicators. The answer choices vary by indicator. For indicators for which the answer choices are strongly agree, agree, disagree and strongly disagree, the index defines individuals with a bias as those who answer strongly agree and agree. For the political indicator on women's rights, for which the answer is given on a numerical scale from 1 to 10, the index defines individuals with a bias as those who choose a rating of 7 or lower. For the physical integrity indicators, for which the answer also ranges from 1 to 10, the index defines individuals with a bias using a proxy variable for intimate partner violence and one for reproductive rights (table 2).

BOX 2

Overlapping intersecting identities

When gender identities overlap with other identities, they combine and intersect to generate distinct prejudices and discriminatory practices that violate individuals' equal rights in society. Intersectionality is the complex, cumulative way the effects of different forms of discrimination combine, overlap or intersect—and are amplified when put together.¹ A sociological term, intersectionality refers to the interconnected nature of social categories such as race, class, age, gender, ability, ethnicity and residence status, regarded as creating overlapping and interdependent systems of discrimination or disadvantage. It emerges from the literature on civil legal rights. It recognizes that policies can exclude people who face overlapping discrimination unique to them.

Overlapping identities must be considered in research and policy analysis because different social

norms and stereotypes of exclusion can be associated with different identities. For instance, regarding median years of education completed in Angola and Guatemala, an important gap distinguishes women in the highest wealth quintile from those in the second or lowest quintile (box figure 1). If the differences are not explicitly considered, public programmes may leave women in the lowest quintiles behind. Moreover, individuals' different social identities can profoundly influence their beliefs and experiences about gender. People who identify with multiple minority groups, such as racial minority women, can easily be excluded and overlooked by policies. But the invisibility produced by interacting identities can also protect vulnerable individuals by making them less prototypical targets of common forms of bias and exclusion.²

How gaps in median years of education distinguish rich from poor in Angola and Guatemala, 2015



Note: Lowest quintile refers to the poorest 20 percent; highest quintile refers to the wealthiest 20 percent.
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys.

Notes

1. IWDA 2018. 2. Biernat and Sesko 2013; Miller 2016; Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach 2008.
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys.

For each indicator a variable takes the value of 1 when an individual has a bias and 0 when the individual does not. Two methods of aggregation are then used in reporting results in the form of an Index. The core gender social norms index (GSNI) is based on the “union approach.” It measures the percentage of people with bias(es), independent of the number of biases. In many instances, it might take only one


bias from one person to block a woman’s progress in society. A second gender social norms index (GSNI2) is based on a simple “intersection approach.” It measures the percentage of people with at least two biases.³²

The methods are applied to two sets of countries. The first set consists of countries with data for either wave 5 (2005–2009) or wave 6 (2010–2014) of the World Values Survey and

The gender social norms index captures how social beliefs can obstruct gender equality along multiple dimensions

FIGURE 5

How social beliefs can obstruct gender and women’s empowerment



Source: Mukhopadhyay, Rivera and Tapia 2019.

uses the latest data available. This set includes 75 countries and territories accounting for 81 percent of the global population. The second set consists of only countries with data for both wave 5 and wave 6. This set includes 31 countries and territories accounting for 59 percent of the global population.

TABLE 2

Definition of bias for the indicators of the multidimensional gender social norms index

Dimension	Indicator	Choices	Bias definition
Political	Men make better political leaders than women do	Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree	Strongly agree and agree
	Women have the same rights as men	1, not essential, to 10, essential	Intermediate form: 1–7
Educational	University is more important for a man than for a woman	Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree	Strongly agree and agree
Economic	Men should have more right to a job than women	Agree, neither, disagree	Strongly agree and agree
	Men make better business executives than women do	Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree	Agree
Physical integrity	Proxy for intimate partner violence	1, never, to 10, always	Strongest form: 2–10
	Proxy for reproductive rights	1, never, to 10, always	Weakest form: 1

Source: Mukhopadhyay, Rivera and Tapia 2019.


Widespread biases and backlash

According to the count index, 91 percent of men and 86 percent of women show at least one clear bias against gender equality in areas such as politics, economic, education, intimate partner violence and women’s reproductive rights (figure 6).

About 50 percent of men and women interviewed across 75 countries say they think

FIGURE 6

Only 14 percent of women and 10 percent of men worldwide have no gender social norms biases



Note: Based on 75 countries and territories with data from wave 5 or 6 of the World Values Survey, accounting for 81 percent of the global population. Source: Mukhopadhyay, Rivera and Tapia (2019), based on data from the World Values Survey.

men make better political leaders than women, while more than 40 percent felt that men made better business executives. Almost 30 percent of people agree it is justifiable for a man to beat his partner.

Women are skewed towards less bias against gender equality and women’s empowerment. Men are concentrated in the middle of the distribution, with 52 percent having two to four gender social norm biases. More than 50 percent of women are biased in the political arena. Men present biases higher than 63 percent in both the political and economic dimensions, especially for the indicators “Men make better political leaders than women do” and “Men should have more right to a job than women.”

Globally close to 50 percent of men agree men should have more right to a job than women. This coincides with the fact that professional women currently face a challenge in finding a partner that will support their career.³³

More worrying, despite decades of progress in advancing women’s rights, bias against gender equality is increasing in some countries, with evidence of a backlash in attitudes among both men and women. According to the GSNI2, the proportion of people with moderate and intense biases against gender equality grew over the last few years in 15 countries (out of 31). The share of both women and men worldwide with moderate to intense gender biases grew from 57 percent to 60 percent for women and from 70 percent to 71 percent for men (table 3). Surveys have shown that younger men may be even less committed to equality than their elders.³⁴

Progress in the share of men with no gender social norms bias was largest in Chile, Australia,

the United States and the Netherlands (figure 7). At the other extreme, indicating a backlash, the share of men with no bias fell in Sweden, Germany, India and Mexico. The share of women with no gender social norms bias increased the most in the Netherlands, Chile and Australia. But most countries in the sample showed a backlash, led by Sweden, India, South Africa and Romania (see figure 7).

What causes change—and what determines its nature?

How can practices and behaviours either change or sustain traditional gender roles? Norms can change as economies develop, with changes in communications technology, with new laws, policies or programmes, with social and political activism and with exposure to new ideas and practices through formal and informal channels (education, role models and media).³⁵

Policymakers often focus on the tangible—on laws, policies, spending commitments, public statements and so on. This is driven partly by the desire to measure impact and by sheer impatience with the slow pace of change. Yet neglecting the invisible power of norms would miss a deeper understanding of social change.³⁶

Consider the subtle differences between descriptive and injunctive norms.³⁷ Descriptive norms are beliefs about what is considered a normal practice in a social group or an area. Injunctive norms state what people in a community should do. This distinction is important for practice, as it can lead to an understanding of why some aspects of gender norms and relations shift faster than others.³⁸

TABLE 3


Bias against gender equality is on the rise

Index	Description	Group	% of people		
			2004–2009	2010–2014	Change
GSNI	With some bias	Women	83.4	84.6	1.2
		Men	89.4	89.9	0.5
GSNI2	With moderate to intense biases	Women	56.6	59.7	3.1
		Men	70.0	70.8	0.8

Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on World Values Survey for 31 countries with time series data, representing 59 percent of the global population.

FIGURE 7

Progress in the share of men with no gender social norms bias from 2005–2009 to 2010–2014 was largest in Chile, Australia, the United States and the Netherlands, while most countries showed a backlash in the share of women with no gender social norms bias



Note: Balanced panel of 31 countries and territories with data from both wave 5 (2005–2009) and wave 6 (2010–2014) of the World Values Survey, accounting for 59 percent of the global population. Source: Mukhopadhyay, Rivera and Tapia (2019), based on data from the World Values Survey.

The family sets norms, and experiences from childhood create an unconscious gender bias.³⁹ Parents’ attitudes towards gender influence children through mid-adolescence, and children at school perceive gender roles.⁴⁰ Parenting practices and behaviours are thus among the predictors of an individual’s gendered behaviours and expectations. For instance, children tend to mimic (in attitudes and actions) how their parents share paid and unpaid work.⁴¹

Adolescence is another key stage for gender socialization, particularly for boys.⁴² Gender is a social construct of attributes or roles associated with being male or female. What it means to be a man or a woman is learned and internalized based on experiences and messages over the course of a lifetime, normalized through social structures, culture and interactions. Young adolescents in different cultural settings commonly endorse norms that perpetuate gender inequalities, and parents and peers are central in shaping such attitudes. Though men usually have more agency than the women in their lives, men’s decisions and behaviours are also profoundly

shaped by rigid social and cultural expectations related to masculinity.⁴³ Some of the endorsed masculinity norms relate to physical toughness (showing higher tolerance for pain, engaging in fights, competing in sports), autonomy (being financially independent, protecting and providing for families), emotional stoicism (not “acting like girls” or showing vulnerabilities, dealing with problems on their own) and heterosexual prowess (having sex with many girls, exercising control over girls in relationships).⁴⁴

Social convention refers to how compliance with gender social norms is internalized in individual values reinforced by rewards or sanctions. Rewards use social or psychological approvals, while sanctions can range from exclusion from the community to violence or legal action. Stigma can limit what is considered normal or acceptable and be used to enforce stereotypes and social norms about appropriate behaviours. A social norm will be stickiest when individuals have the most to gain from complying with it and the most to lose from challenging it. Social norms have enough power to keep women from

BOX 3


The gender social norms index in practice

How does a subjective indicator of social norms compare with objective indicators of gender inequality?

The multidimensional gender social norms indices appear linked to gender inequality, as might be expected. In countries with higher biases (measured through the multidimensional gender social norms indices), overall inequality (measured by the Gender Inequality Index) is higher (box figure 1). Similarly, the indices are positively related to time spent on unpaid domestic chores and care work.

Biases in social norms also show a gradient. The political and economic dimensions of the multidimensional gender social norms index indicate biases for basic women's achievement and against more enhanced women's achievement (box table 1). Overall, the biases appear more intense for more enhanced forms of women's participation. The proportion of people favouring men over women for high-level political and economic leadership positions is higher than the proportion of people favouring men over women in access to basic political rights or paid employment.

Box figure 1 Countries with higher social norms biases tend to have higher gender inequality



Source: Mukhopadhyay, Rivera and Tapia (2019), based on data from the World Values Survey and UNDP (2019), *Dashboard 2* in the statistical annex.

Box table 1 Biases in social norms show a gradient (percentage of people biased by indicator)

	Politics		The economy	
	Basic	Enhanced	Basic	Enhanced
	Not essential: Women have the same rights as men	Men make better political leaders than women do	Men should have more right to a job than women	Men make better business executives than women do
Simple average	29.2	46.1	36.0	40.3
Median	28.2	48.0	30.7	41.0
Weighted average	25.6	47.4	40.0	41.4

Note: Based on 75 countries and territories with data from wave 5 (2005–2009) or wave 6 (2011–2014) of the World Values Survey, accounting for 81 percent of the global population.

Source: Mukhopadhyay, Rivera and Tapia (2019), based on data from the World Values Survey.

Human development is about expanding substantive freedoms and choices, and too often women face heavily restricted or even “tragic” choices

claiming their legal rights due to pressure to conform to societal expectations.⁴⁵

Social norms can also prevail when individuals lack the information or knowledge to act or think differently. Because of intertwined social dynamics, challenging discriminatory norms that impede gender equality and women’s empowerment requires acting on more than one factor at a time.

Restricted choices and power imbalances—a lifecycle perspective

Gender inequality within households and communities is characterized by inequality across multiple dimensions, with a vicious cycle of powerlessness, stigmatization, discrimination, exclusion and material deprivation all reinforcing each other. Human development is about expanding substantive freedoms and choices, and too often women face heavily restricted or even “tragic” choices.

Examples of restricted choices can be identified in a lifecycle approach. Some represent blatant limits to basic freedoms and human rights, and others, subtle manifestations of gender biases. Social norms can affect girls even before they are born since some countries deeply prefer bearing sons over daughters. In 1990, when only few countries had access to technology to determine a baby’s gender, only 6 countries had imbalanced sex ratios at birth—today it is 21 countries.

Discrimination continues through the way households share resources. Girls and women sometimes eat last and least in the household.⁴⁶ The gender politics of food—nurtured by assumptions, norms and practices about women needing fewer calories—can push women into perpetual malnutrition and protein deficiency.

Among children attending school, determinants of occupational choices appear very early. Girls are less likely to study subjects such as science, technology, engineering and mathematics, while boys are a minority of those studying health and education. For example, in OECD countries, on average among STEM graduates, only 32.6 percent are women.⁴⁷ More worrying, artificial intelligence applications can replicate and exacerbate these biases (box 4).

Early marriage condemns girls to live a life with heavily restricted choices—every year 12 million girls are victims of forced marriage. By region, the highest rates are registered in Sub-Saharan Africa, with 36 percent of women marrying before their 18th birthday, and South Asia, with 29 percent.⁴⁸

The disparities of childhood and adolescence are amplified when women reach adulthood. For unpaid care work, women bear a bigger burden, on average spending about 2.5 times more than men do. This affects women’s labor force participation, which is consistently lower than for men, both globally and by human development grouping. In 2018 the global labour force participation rate was around 75 percent for men and 48 percent for women.⁴⁹ Professional women mostly have two options for their personal partners—a super-supportive partner or no partner at all.⁵⁰ Husbands are considered a key factor in two-thirds of women’s decisions to quit the workforce, often because women had to fill the parenting vacuum.⁵¹ In other instances, the struggle to reconcile care work with paid work can lead women to occupational downgrading.

Additionally, skilled women, who are more likely to participate in the labor market, face social norms that make them less attractive potential partners in the marriage market. This contributes towards a lower marriage rate for skilled women, and might induce a nonlinear relationship between their labor market prospects and their marriage outcomes.⁵²

Older women’s challenges accumulate through the life course. They are less likely than men to have access to pensions, even though they can expect to live three years longer. Along the way, social norms and path dependence—how outcomes today affect outcomes tomorrow—interact to form a highly complex system of structural gender gaps.

Policies to tackle social norms—game changers

Universal policies can provide basic floors but may not be enough to eliminate horizontal inequalities rooted in social exclusion and longstanding social norms. Social exclusion happens when people are unable to fully

BOX 4

Artificial intelligence and the risk of bias: making horizontal inequalities worse?

Artificial intelligence applications have the potential to support positive social change—indeed, in some domains their impact could be revolutionary. But as with any new technology, actually achieving these positive results is challenging and risky.

Many groups of people across the globe may be on the receiving end of artificial intelligence's downside. They may lose their jobs as more tasks are performed by machine learning—even if net job loss is contained, inequalities in income and wealth could rise, and the quality of jobs fall. Workers may see strong biases against their skin colour or gender embedded in machine learning, and they may be subjects of surveillance. Algorithms for job matching may reproduce historical biases and prejudices. Companies need policies on transparency and data protection so that workers know what is being tracked. Regulation may be needed to govern data use and algorithm accountability in the world of work.

As uses of artificial intelligence become pervasive, questions arise about the rise of propaganda and manipulation, undermining democracy, and about surveillance and the loss of privacy. For example, artificial intelligence applications are linked with the development of smart cities.¹ This involves collecting data from

cameras and sensors on a large scale. How does this differ from mass surveillance?

Machine learning algorithms are not biased inherently; they learn to be biased. Algorithmic bias occurs when the learning algorithm is trained on biased datasets and subsequently “accurately” learns the patterns of bias in the data.² In some cases the learned representations within machine learning algorithms can even exaggerate these biases.³ For example, women are less likely to receive targeted ads for high-paying jobs potentially because the algorithm that targets the ads trained on data in which women had lower paying jobs.⁴ And a computer programme used in the United States to assess the risk of reoffending by individuals in the criminal justice system incorrectly flagged black defendants as high risk nearly twice as often as white defendants.⁵

Facial recognition services can be much less accurate in identifying women or people with darker skin.⁶

The well recognized lack of diversity among the people designing and developing artificial intelligence is another problem. Few women work in artificial intelligence, as in the tech sector in general, and among the men, racial diversity is limited.⁷ Diverse teams, bringing diverse perspectives, representative of the general population, could check biases.

Targeted or affirmative action policies that directly support disadvantaged groups can complement universal policies

Notes

1. Glaeser and others 2018. 2. Caliskan, Bryson and Narayanan 2017; Danks and London 2017. 3. Zhao, Wang and others 2017. 4. Spice 2015. 5. IDRC 2018. 6. Boulamwini and Gebru 2018. 7. IDRC 2018.

participate in economic, social and political life because they are excluded based on cultural, religious, racial or other reasons.⁵³ This may mean a lack of voice, lack of recognition or lack of capacity for active participation. It may also mean exclusion from decent work, assets, land, opportunities, access to social services or political representation.⁵⁴

When horizontal inequalities are large, targeted or affirmative action policies that directly support disadvantaged groups—as with access to credit, scholarships or certain group quotas in employment and education—can complement universal policies. Several historical examples show that a combination of universal and targeted policies can reduce horizontal inequalities.⁵⁵ But there is also a risk that targeted policies further reinforce group differences or grievances, since members receive benefits precisely because of their group identity. Targeted policies are particularly relevant when a group

has clearly been disadvantaged historically,⁵⁶ with policies having a defined timeframe so that they are applied only if the targeted group is truly disadvantaged. Clear communication about the policies is crucial to prevent grievances and feelings of disadvantage.

Since gender remains one of the most prevalent bases of discrimination, policies addressing deep-seated discriminatory norms and harmful gender stereotypes, prejudices and practices are key for the full realization of women's human rights.⁵⁷

Policies can target social norms directly. Changing unequal power relationships among individuals within a community or challenging deeply rooted gender roles can be achieved through education, by raising awareness or by changing incentives. Education and raising awareness are both based on providing individuals with new information and knowledge that can foster different values and behaviours. Such

Policies are important in areas ranging from protection from violence and discrimination to access to public services

initiatives might include formal education, workplace training or media campaigns against gender stereotyping. To change incentives, protective mechanisms can confront possible harm due to traditional gender norms or a backlash, such as school bullying or workplace harassment. Changing incentives can also be introduced to delay early marriage and reduce teenage pregnancies. The three dimensions (education, awareness, incentives) often reinforce each other, as the examples of policies included here suggest.

For example, Québec's 2006 nontransferable parental leave for fathers shifted incentives so that fathers became more involved in home caregiving. With new benefits fathers increased their participation in parental leave by 250 percent,⁵⁸ contributing to reverse the social norm that expected mothers to take sole responsibility for care work. And in households where men had the opportunity to use the benefit, fathers' daily time in household work was 23 percent higher than in households where new fathers did not participate, long after the leave period ended.⁵⁹ This example also shows the importance of including men in gender equality policies. In fact, according to a survey on implementing gender strategies or policies in Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, almost everyone considers changing men's and boys' attitudes towards care activities to be the priority.⁶⁰ Yet, even though the importance of adequately engaging men and boys in overcoming gender inequality or addressing their own gender-related vulnerabilities is widely acknowledged, public policies have yet to fully consider that dimension.⁶¹

Thus, laws and regulations can balance the distribution of care work in households, but only about half of the countries in the world offer paternity leave in addition to maternity leave, and half of them offer fewer than 3 weeks for fathers and 80 percent offer fewer than 14 weeks for mothers.⁶² In 2007 the Republic of Korea started to reserve a year of paternal leave, and by 2014 the number of male workers who took advantage of it had tripled.⁶³ And some countries offer economic incentives for workers to use leave, as in Sweden, where parents receive a small gender-equality financial bonus for every day they use parental leave equally.

This way, fathers' share of childcare during the early months or years of a child's life can be increased, which may allow for changes in social norms around childcare that can be reflected throughout a child's life.

Balancing the distribution of care, particularly for children, is crucial precisely because much of the difference in earnings throughout the lifecycle is generated before age 40, leading women to miss many labour market opportunities during the early stages of their careers.⁶⁴ These missed opportunities coincide with childbirth, which can encourage women to withdraw from the labour market. Offering access to affordable childcare can provide mothers opportunities to make their own work–life decisions, allowing them to engage in paid work. Mothers tend to adjust their choices around paid work to the demands of childcare.⁶⁵ That is why accessible and affordable childcare is relevant for mothers' freedom to engage in paid work.⁶⁶

The impact of regulations and laws goes beyond changing the balance of care. Policies are important in areas ranging from protection from violence and discrimination to access to public services. But the way policies are designed and implemented is determined, in part, by participation in politics. Thus, affirmative action quotas that increase minority participation in politics can result in a stronger institutional commitment to equality and non-discrimination. Even though Tunisia is a young democracy (its first constitution was ratified in 2014), it now has one of the world's most progressive gender parity laws, with legislated candidate, constitutional and electoral quotas. The regulations guarantee equal opportunities for women and men at all levels of responsibility in all fields and ask candidates to file candidacy applications on the basis of parity between men and women. By 2018 women occupied 47 percent of local council positions.⁶⁷ Almost all countries with high female political representation have such enabling measures as positive discrimination and affirmative action.

Policies can also increase the representation of girls in STEM. Laboratoria, a nonprofit organization established in Latin America in 2014, combines applied coding education, socioemotional training and job placement services to create opportunities for girls from low-income families. It operates in Brazil,

Chile, Mexico and Peru, and has graduated more than 820 girls and aims to reach 5,000 young women by 2021.⁶⁸ Other examples include the Costa Rican Technological Institute, which set up a specialized training centre to build women's capacity in STEM and entrepreneurship. Cenfotec University and the institute established a follow-up strategy to create technology training spaces and support all women interested in a STEM career. NiñaSTEM (GirlSTEM), launched in early 2017 by the Mexican government in partnership with the OECD, invites women with prominent science and mathematics careers to act as mentors, visiting schools and encouraging girls to choose STEM subjects and be ambitious.⁶⁹

For girls to choose STEM they must be in school. Some interventions can change incentives for girls to stay in school by either delaying marriage or reducing adolescent pregnancy. Cash transfers have been proven to increase school attendance. The Zomba Cash Transfer Programme in Malawi, where pregnancy is a key reason girls drop out, gave conditional and unconditional transfers to girls in school. It significantly reduced HIV prevalence and pregnancy and early marriage rates and improved language test scores.⁷⁰

As with education, it is important to consider how women may be uniquely vulnerable to health inequalities because of their sexual and reproductive health care needs. Reproductive health, which gives women agency and control over their own body and fertility, still has much room for progress. In Tigray, Ethiopia, a

service delivery model combining community-based distribution of contraception with social marketing benefits women and their communities.⁷¹ In Bujumbura, the capital of Burundi, the government, with support from the United Nations Population Fund, is implementing a national module for comprehensive sexuality education in all schools to empower girls and women through awareness of and access to sexual and reproductive health assistance and family planning services—and to provide the community a platform for dialogue on sexual education and sexual and reproductive rights.⁷²

Finally, social norms mold individuals' behaviours and beliefs about violence against women. Preventive policies can target both women and men. For example, SASA!, a programme designed by Raising Voices and first implemented in Kampala, Uganda, targets traditional social norms that perpetuate violence against women. Addressing both women and men in households, it approaches the power imbalance at the individual and structural levels by making communities rethink household relationship dynamics. Today the programme's results have been widely tested and standardized, as in Haiti and Tanzania, and it has been scaled up to 25 countries.⁷³

The backlash against changing gender roles in households, workplaces and politics affects entire societies influenced by shifting power relations. The resistance to changes in gender expectations may lead to a perceived clash and reveal subconscious biases. But remember: even norms can be shifted towards gender equality.

**But remember:
even norms can
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gender equality**

Notes

- 1 UNDP 2018; UN Women 2019; WEF 2018; World Bank 2012.
- 2 UNDP 2018.
- 3 WEF 2018, 2020.
- 4 UN Women and IPU 2019.
- 5 Divya 2018.
- 6 Giraldo-Luque and others 2018.
- 7 Hinsliff 2020; Minutaglio 2020.
- 8 Calculations based on data from UNDP 2019, Statistical table 4.
- 9 Calculations based on data from the World Values Survey (Inglehart and others 2014).
- 10 UNDP 2018; UN Women 2019; WEF 2018; World Bank 2012.
- 11 Haan 2009; IPU 2019; WEF 2020.
- 12 Dilli and Riipma 2019.
- 13 UNDP 1995, p. 29.
- 14 UN 2015.
- 15 Nussbaum 2001, p. 1.
- 16 UN 2015, SDGs.
- 17 UNDP and UN Women 2019.
- 18 See the discussion in Human Development Report 2019 (UNDP 2019).
- 19 UN Women and IPU 2019.
- 20 Forbes 2019; ILO 2019.
- 21 Catalyst 2020.
- 22 UNDP 2019, Dashboard 3 Women's empowerment.
- 23 UNDP 2019, Dashboard 2 Life-course gender gap.
- 24 FAO Stat 2011.
- 25 Keleher and Franklin 2008; Marcus 2018; Marcus and Harper 2014; Munoz Boudet and others 2012; Sen, Ostlin and George 2007.
- 26 Marcus and Harper 2014.
- 27 Bicchieri 2006; Fehr, Fischbacher and Gächter 2002; Ostrom 2000.
- 28 Galvan and Garcia-Peñalosa 2018.
- 29 OECD 2017; UNDP 2019; UN Women 2015b; UN Women 2019; WEF 2018.
- 30 Mackie and others 2015.
- 31 Charles 2012.
- 32 A third Gender Social Norms Index (GSNI) follows the synthetic Alkire–Foster methodology (GNI/AF), which implements a version of the intersection approach (to define the headcount of biased individuals) coupled with a measure of the intensity of biases (see Mukhopadhyay, Rivera and Tapia 2019).
- 33 Wittenberg-Cox 2017.
- 34 Coontz 2017; Pepin and Cotter 2017.
- 35 Marcus and Harper 2015.
- 36 Green 2016.
- 37 Gintis 2007.
- 38 Cislaghi, Manji and Heise 2018; Cooper and Fletcher 2013; Marcus and Harper 2014.
- 39 Bandura 2003; Mackie and others 2015; Munoz Boudet and others 2012; Sood, Menard and Witte 2009.
- 40 Bian, Leslie and Cimpian 2017; Cunningham 2001.
- 41 OECD 2017.
- 42 Amin and others 2018.
- 43 Masculinity is the pattern of social behaviours or practices associated with ideals about how men should behave (Ricardo and MenEngage 2014).
- 44 Kågesten and others 2016.
- 45 UN Women 2015b.
- 46 UNDP 2016.
- 47 UNDP 2019, Dashboard 3 Women's empowerment.
- 48 UNDP 2019, Dashboard 3 Women's empowerment.
- 49 UNDP 2019, *Statistical table 5 (GII)*.
- 50 Wittenberg-Cox 2017.
- 51 Stone and Lovejoy 2004.
- 52 Bertrand and others 2016.
- 53 Stewart 2006.
- 54 UNDESA 2009.
- 55 Stewart 2016.
- 56 Langer and Stewart 2015; Stewart 2016.
- 57 UN CEB 2017.
- 58 Silcoff 2018.
- 59 Patnaik 2019.
- 60 OECD 2017.
- 61 Barker and others 2016.
- 62 Human Development Report Office calculations based on data from the WORLD Policy Analysis Center's Gender Database 2019.
- 63 Park 2015.
- 64 OECD 2017.
- 65 OECD 2017.
- 66 Del Boca 2015; Jaumotte 2013; Olivetti and Petrongolo 2017; Thévenon 2013. Québec introduced a low-fee universal child care programme in 1997 for children up to age 4, increasing the participation of young women in the labour force. This incentive to join the labour force or to work more also yielded substantial lifecycle labour supply effects (Lefebvre, Merrigan and Verstraete 2009). And when Québec introduced universal access to low-fee child care in 2008, nearly 70,000 more mothers took jobs than if no such programme had existed, for an increase of 3.8 percent in women's employment and 1.7 percent increase in Québec's GDP (Fortin, Godbout and St-Cerny 2012; Herrera 2019).
- 67 UN Women 2018.
- 68 OECD 2017. Source: Human Development Report Office based on Guaqueta (2017), Laboratoria (2019) and World Bank (2013).
- 69 OECD 2017.
- 70 Baird, McIntosh and Özler 2013; Hagen-Zanker and others 2017.
- 71 The programme recruited volunteer community health workers who administered injectable contraceptives, charging a small fee, or provided counselling and referrals for other methods. The option to have community meetings and provide contraceptives door to door took the cultural and social conditions into account in increasing the awareness, acceptability and use of modern contraceptives (Bixby Center for Population Health and Sustainability 2014).
- 72 As well as family planning services, to provide the community with a platform for dialogue on sexual education and sexual and reproductive rights. Information about sexual and reproductive health is disseminated through youth peer networks, many of them affiliated with school, community, religious and youth associations. The government has received United Nations Population Fund support to develop the school club model and two manuals for teachers and students (UNFPA 2019).
- 73 The word "sasa", which means "now" in Kiswahili, is an acronym for the four phases of the approach: Start, Awareness, Support, Action. The programme begins by partnering with a local organization, which selects an equal number of female and male community activists—regular people interested in issues of violence, power and rights, as well as institutional activists working for the police and in health care, local government and faith-based groups. The activists receive training in new concepts and ways to approach power imbalances. They then take the lead in organizing informal activities with their community networks to encourage open discussions and critical thinking. Combined, the strategies ensure that different community members are exposed and receive information from people they trust (Raising Voices, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine and Center for Domestic Violence Prevention 2015).

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Gender Social Norms Index (GSNI), last available period

Country	Period	GSNI	GSNI2	Share of people with no bias	Share of people biased by dimension			
		(share of people with at least 1 bias)	(share of people with at least 2 biases)		Political	Economic	Educational	Physical integrity
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Algeria	2010–2014	97.83	87.00	2.17	80.08	74.08	37.17	86.75
Andorra	2005–2009	27.01	7.43	72.99	14.08	8.73	1.81	12.01
Argentina	2010–2014	75.41	42.49	24.59	43.35	30.43	17.04	52.86
Armenia	2010–2014	94.11	81.28	5.89	72.82	75.91	24.89	66.14
Australia	2010–2014	46.24	23.00	53.76	32.48	18.06	4.09	20.93
Azerbaijan	2010–2014	99.14	93.82	0.86	85.13	91.97	30.90	72.16
Belarus	2010–2014	90.37	71.70	9.63	77.82	58.45	21.19	55.52
Brazil	2010–2014	89.50	52.39	10.50	43.41	36.63	9.32	77.95
Bulgaria	2005–2009	76.84	44.40	23.16	53.67	37.13	10.95	39.42
Burkina Faso	2005–2009	98.38	85.86	1.62	66.42	77.27	33.20	88.81
Canada	2005–2009	51.53	23.26	48.47	25.40	21.39	4.91	30.50
Chile	2010–2014	74.40	42.20	25.60	42.10	28.40	20.10	52.60
China	2010–2014	88.27	64.42	11.73	55.47	54.87	22.02	67.01
Colombia	2010–2014	91.40	57.21	8.60	49.34	33.73	10.78	82.28
Cyprus	2010–2014	81.05	49.44	18.95	48.14	43.85	14.03	53.31
Ecuador	2010–2014	93.34	58.90	6.66	46.34	36.44	23.46	84.36
Estonia	2010–2014	76.34	51.19	23.66	57.05	45.29	15.79	36.24
Ethiopia	2005–2009	85.27	35.14	14.73	30.27	22.00	8.00	80.60
Finland	2005–2009	51.16	22.67	48.84	24.58	23.08	6.22	29.69
France	2005–2009	56.00	26.81	44.00	35.25	25.55	6.71	22.41
Georgia	2010–2014	94.09	77.12	5.91	65.89	66.97	18.14	74.63
Germany	2010–2014	62.60	33.07	37.40	26.59	30.91	15.78	44.68
Ghana	2010–2014	99.16	92.69	0.84	86.84	78.01	30.02	90.73
Haiti	2010–2014	98.91	92.82	1.09	76.33	72.06	59.91	88.13
Hungary	2005–2009	65.89	40.36	34.11	42.84	37.86	18.75	30.99
India	2010–2014	98.28	83.25	1.72	64.10	69.91	35.24	88.38
Indonesia	2005–2009	97.44	80.36	2.56	66.47	66.40	19.31	90.55
Iran, Islamic Republic of	2005–2009	98.54	92.49	1.46	84.63	88.86	55.42	78.69
Iraq	2010–2014	97.50	90.58	2.50	88.33	79.75	31.33	85.08
Japan	2010–2014	68.81	41.67	31.19	46.87	41.79	16.21	26.28
Jordan	2010–2014	99.33	95.67	0.67	91.17	89.42	28.75	81.50
Kazakhstan	2010–2014	96.22	79.02	3.78	75.22	67.54	21.71	68.51
Korea (Republic of)	2010–2014	87.07	62.91	12.93	63.68	54.33	25.67	58.27
Kuwait	2010–2014	97.77	91.56	2.23	88.10	77.13	36.45	83.12
Kyrgyzstan	2010–2014	96.73	84.87	3.27	76.80	71.53	41.00	81.73
Lebanon	2010–2014	96.08	82.33	3.92	75.42	60.17	31.08	82.83
Libya	2010–2014	99.13	92.89	0.87	83.14	84.45	31.49	92.15
Malaysia	2010–2014	98.54	88.38	1.46	79.69	74.54	43.00	94.31
Mali	2005–2009	98.82	93.36	1.18	81.89	88.87	47.61	84.87
Mexico	2010–2014	87.70	51.00	12.30	41.40	29.35	20.70	75.55
Moldova, Republic of	2005–2009	90.06	67.21	9.94	60.33	58.80	16.73	65.20
Morocco	2010–2014	96.25	80.58	3.75	69.00	72.50	19.58	82.50
Netherlands	2010–2014	39.75	15.88	60.25	21.29	13.56	4.63	22.03
New Zealand	2010–2014	46.14	21.28	53.86	27.23	16.65	5.35	25.33
Nigeria	2010–2014	99.73	94.99	0.27	85.83	83.42	46.18	92.78
Norway	2005–2009	41.27	16.00	58.73	19.51	21.85	3.71	16.78
Pakistan	2010–2014	99.81	98.07	0.19	81.32	91.02	51.11	93.75
Palestine, State of	2010–2014	98.00	92.30	2.00	89.30	79.50	26.70	83.50
Peru	2010–2014	87.96	49.99	12.04	38.44	27.05	14.36	79.76
Philippines	2010–2014	98.87	86.80	1.13	70.62	73.80	39.08	91.48
Poland	2010–2014	79.75	47.31	20.25	43.74	41.99	11.91	53.02
Qatar	2010–2014	99.73	94.90	0.27	91.56	81.66	27.60	87.25
Romania	2010–2014	85.50	60.84	14.50	48.78	55.88	20.69	63.54
Russian Federation	2010–2014	86.83	68.56	13.17	68.43	58.77	22.66	50.02
Rwanda	2010–2014	99.15	89.39	0.85	67.78	65.68	36.15	97.64
Serbia	2005–2009	82.62	48.61	17.38	47.05	35.49	13.20	66.56
Singapore	2010–2014	92.34	73.20	7.66	76.18	52.23	26.18	65.66
Slovenia	2010–2014	59.21	28.25	40.79	33.58	25.91	8.04	29.93
South Africa	2010–2014	96.32	80.90	3.68	75.56	57.06	38.80	88.80
Spain	2010–2014	50.50	25.16	49.50	29.40	20.48	11.61	28.05
Sweden	2010–2014	30.01	10.75	69.99	16.05	9.16	2.61	14.13
Switzerland	2005–2009	56.03	26.94	43.97	20.56	29.80	9.28	31.18

Country	Period	GSI (share of people with at least 1 bias) %	GSI2 (share of people with at least 2 biases) %	Share of people with no bias %	Share of people biased by dimension			
					Political %	Economic %	Educational %	Physical integrity %
Thailand	2010–2014	95.47	74.50	4.53	67.30	50.86	29.02	84.53
Trinidad and Tobago	2010–2014	85.99	51.25	14.01	39.14	37.74	5.61	72.17
Tunisia	2010–2014	96.35	84.07	3.65	78.42	79.34	24.48	83.82
Turkey	2010–2014	96.52	85.70	3.48	76.02	80.25	32.04	77.56
Ukraine	2010–2014	86.53	65.40	13.47	62.63	57.69	18.23	56.61
United Kingdom	2005–2009	54.60	25.50	45.40	26.07	25.15	6.65	30.34
United States	2010–2014	57.31	30.07	42.69	39.90	14.81	6.54	34.57
Uruguay	2010–2014	74.60	36.70	25.40	28.60	34.30	9.20	51.40
Uzbekistan	2010–2014	97.93	87.73	2.07	78.67	80.33	48.60	83.93
Viet Nam	2005–2009	92.89	69.17	7.11	59.40	62.49	20.36	70.56
Yemen	2010–2014	97.80	92.10	2.20	87.40	87.20	45.30	81.00
Zambia	2005–2009	96.84	80.56	3.16	66.04	55.41	23.53	89.07
Zimbabwe	2010–2014	99.52	84.78	0.48	78.16	57.30	16.20	96.27
Overall average^{a,b}	last available	88.35	67.82	11.65	58.68	56.61	25.63	71.95

NOTES

- a** Averages for the global aggregate were calculated weighting for each country's 2015 population as published by UNDESA (2019).
- b** Based on 75 countries with data from wave 5 (2005–2009) and wave 6 (2010–2014) of the World Values Survey, representing 81 percent of the global population.

DEFINITIONS

Gender Social Norms Index (GSI): Percentage of people with at least one bias among seven indicators.

Gender Social Norms Index (GSI2): Percentage of people with at least two biases among seven indicators.

MAIN DATA SOURCES

Columns 1–7: Mukhopadhyay, Rivera and Tapia (2019) based on data from the World Values Survey (Inglehart and others 2014).

Gender Social Norms Index (GSNI), last available period by gender

Country	Period	GSNI (share of people with at least 1 bias)		GSNI2 (share of people with at least 2 biases)		Share of people with no bias		Share of people biased by dimension							
		% of women	% of men	% of women	% of men	% of women	% of men	Political		Economic		Educational		Physical integrity	
								% of women	% of men	% of women	% of men	% of women	% of men	% of women	% of men
Algeria	2010–2014	96.96	98.68	79.39	94.41	3.04	1.32	70.44	89.47	61.82	86.02	29.05	45.07	85.14	88.32
Andorra	2005–2009	22.99	30.69	6.19	8.56	77.01	69.31	11.10	16.80	7.23	10.11	1.81	1.81	10.47	13.42
Argentina	2010–2014	73.47	77.65	37.55	48.22	26.53	22.35	37.65	49.96	24.87	36.88	13.18	21.51	54.31	51.17
Armenia	2010–2014	92.18	96.16	73.82	89.20	7.82	3.84	62.66	83.60	69.86	82.33	20.44	29.62	59.45	73.24
Australia	2010–2014	37.53	54.54	15.40	30.25	62.47	45.46	24.54	40.06	11.46	24.35	3.10	5.05	16.67	24.99
Azerbaijan	2010–2014	98.37	99.92	89.27	98.49	1.63	0.08	77.78	92.67	88.01	96.02	22.44	39.58	63.92	80.60
Belarus	2010–2014	86.73	94.73	61.72	83.65	13.27	5.27	72.61	84.05	46.80	72.40	13.47	30.43	48.28	64.19
Brazil	2010–2014	88.89	90.16	46.49	58.86	11.11	9.84	37.65	49.73	28.91	45.08	9.17	9.48	80.69	74.96
Bulgaria	2005–2009	67.35	87.09	31.39	58.44	32.65	12.91	44.22	63.87	23.96	51.35	8.96	13.09	32.85	46.72
Burkina Faso	2005–2009	98.07	98.64	80.52	91.19	1.93	1.36	60.57	72.31	71.62	82.58	27.91	38.42	87.14	90.45
Canada	2005–2009	50.80	52.68	22.79	23.97	49.20	47.32	24.88	26.10	20.24	22.82	4.27	5.65	30.28	31.01
Chile	2010–2014	69.43	79.51	32.94	51.72	30.57	20.49	35.90	48.48	20.71	36.31	12.62	27.79	49.90	55.38
China	2010–2014	84.65	91.78	59.07	69.60	15.35	8.22	50.76	60.03	47.72	61.78	19.50	24.46	64.55	69.40
Colombia	2010–2014	91.73	91.07	53.94	60.53	8.27	8.93	47.90	50.80	29.53	38.00	8.66	12.93	82.28	82.27
Cyprus	2010–2014	77.18	85.01	41.87	57.17	22.82	14.99	40.96	55.48	31.71	56.25	8.95	19.21	54.70	51.89
Ecuador	2010–2014	93.06	93.64	55.48	62.54	6.94	6.36	41.77	51.20	34.03	39.00	20.16	26.98	84.19	84.54
Estonia	2010–2014	71.80	81.91	44.35	59.58	28.20	18.09	51.59	63.75	37.61	54.71	13.68	18.38	31.94	41.52
Ethiopia	2005–2009	83.47	86.98	26.72	43.10	16.53	13.02	23.76	36.40	13.87	29.66	5.91	9.97	81.18	80.05
Finland	2005–2009	44.33	58.61	17.22	28.61	55.67	41.39	20.10	29.46	17.97	28.65	5.49	7.02	25.65	34.08
France	2005–2009	55.65	56.39	24.07	29.80	44.35	43.61	33.30	37.38	25.04	26.11	5.23	8.32	20.97	23.98
Georgia	2010–2014	92.76	95.66	72.42	82.64	7.24	4.34	62.56	69.80	61.48	73.42	16.80	19.71	71.19	78.66
Germany	2010–2014	55.26	70.29	25.78	40.71	44.74	29.71	20.42	33.05	23.19	38.98	11.64	20.12	39.43	50.16
Ghana	2010–2014	98.92	99.39	88.77	96.54	1.08	0.61	82.82	90.78	68.39	87.46	21.63	38.26	89.55	91.89
Haiti	2010–2014	97.96	99.90	86.20	99.58	2.04	0.10	72.86	79.90	50.94	94.05	43.29	77.21	81.31	95.10
Hungary	2005–2009	61.66	70.73	32.06	49.85	38.34	29.27	36.77	49.79	33.14	43.26	17.13	20.61	28.03	34.36
India	2010–2014	97.09	99.21	77.14	88.03	2.91	0.79	56.69	69.91	61.79	76.24	31.04	38.52	85.94	90.26
Indonesia	2005–2009	96.44	98.36	72.57	87.55	3.56	1.64	55.31	76.70	54.95	76.86	17.29	21.16	91.26	89.90
Iran, Islamic Republic of	2005–2009	97.79	99.24	88.59	96.29	2.21	0.76	79.48	89.71	84.50	93.19	46.66	63.99	76.22	80.92
Iraq	2010–2014	94.92	99.84	82.31	98.09	5.08	0.16	80.21	95.71	65.85	92.37	22.07	39.75	78.81	90.78
Japan	2010–2014	64.93	72.98	37.68	45.96	35.07	27.02	44.08	49.87	39.26	44.52	15.40	17.08	21.01	31.95
Jordan	2010–2014	99.17	99.50	95.50	95.83	0.83	0.50	90.83	91.50	88.33	90.50	20.17	37.33	79.17	83.83
Kazakhstan	2010–2014	94.78	97.85	72.89	86.00	5.22	2.15	71.43	79.52	61.10	74.86	19.12	24.66	63.68	74.00
Korea (Republic of)	2010–2014	84.30	89.90	58.63	67.30	15.70	10.10	58.65	68.82	50.99	57.76	24.15	27.23	55.36	61.24
Kuwait	2010–2014	96.28	99.00	84.03	96.00	3.72	1.00	78.34	93.88	61.49	85.52	28.45	40.57	85.12	83.77
Kyrgyzstan	2010–2014	96.34	97.15	80.89	88.99	3.66	2.85	71.99	81.79	64.27	79.08	34.82	47.42	82.07	81.39
Lebanon	2010–2014	94.61	97.62	77.78	87.07	5.39	2.38	69.61	81.46	56.37	64.12	29.08	33.16	82.35	83.33
Libya	2010–2014	98.63	99.58	87.72	97.60	1.37	0.42	72.25	93.07	74.01	93.95	17.59	44.15	89.87	94.24
Malaysia	2010–2014	97.31	99.70	82.44	94.01	2.69	0.30	72.63	86.38	63.13	85.33	33.70	51.80	94.78	93.86
Mali	2005–2009	98.60	99.04	90.49	96.17	1.40	0.96	78.15	85.57	85.49	92.21	43.99	51.17	81.89	87.80
Mexico	2010–2014	88.21	87.19	49.25	52.75	11.79	12.81	40.36	42.44	25.67	33.03	19.18	22.22	76.22	74.87
Moldova, Republic of	2005–2009	88.38	91.92	58.62	76.77	11.62	8.08	53.72	67.68	52.27	66.06	12.70	21.21	61.16	69.70
Morocco	2010–2014	93.54	98.99	67.55	93.79	6.46	1.01	55.63	82.55	59.27	85.91	15.40	23.83	76.32	88.76
Netherlands	2010–2014	32.51	48.08	12.48	19.80	67.49	51.92	17.68	25.45	9.72	17.99	2.55	7.01	18.86	25.68
New Zealand	2010–2014	41.49	52.12	18.05	25.21	58.51	47.88	23.86	31.44	14.52	18.98	3.73	7.37	23.86	27.48
Nigeria	2010–2014	99.53	99.93	91.97	97.84	0.47	0.07	80.52	90.84	77.16	89.34	40.45	51.59	90.72	94.73
Norway	2005–2009	38.55	43.97	12.92	19.07	61.45	56.03	19.18	19.84	17.22	26.46	2.74	4.67	16.05	17.51
Pakistan	2010–2014	99.61	100.00	96.61	99.45	0.39	0.00	74.79	87.46	87.09	94.72	49.35	52.77	93.02	94.45
Palestine, State of	2010–2014	97.07	98.98	89.06	95.70	2.93	1.02	85.35	93.44	71.68	87.70	18.75	35.04	81.05	86.07
Peru	2010–2014	86.31	89.61	46.77	53.19	13.69	10.39	34.51	42.34	21.71	32.35	13.33	15.38	80.33	79.20
Philippines	2010–2014	98.75	98.98	83.29	90.31	1.25	1.02	65.10	76.14	67.43	80.17	32.96	45.21	91.69	91.26
Poland	2010–2014	79.04	80.55	45.86	48.95	20.96	19.45	41.11	46.73	41.07	43.04	9.39	14.76	54.73	51.08
Qatar	2010–2014	99.67	99.81	94.35	95.54	0.33	0.19	89.95	93.46	80.60	82.92	27.98	27.16	85.78	88.99
Romania	2010–2014	83.07	88.12	55.73	66.34	16.93	11.88	42.71	55.32	52.79	59.23	17.07	24.60	62.09	65.11
Russian Federation	2010–2014	82.63	91.94	61.45	77.22	17.37	8.06	63.14	74.83	52.51	66.35	18.75	27.42	43.64	57.80
Rwanda	2010–2014	99.22	99.08	89.22	89.56	0.78	0.92	67.92	67.64	60.91	70.54	36.36	35.93	97.66	97.62
Serbia	2005–2009	76.74	88.35	38.87	58.09	23.26	11.65	36.21	57.61	21.93	48.71	8.80	17.48	64.78	68.28
Singapore	2010–2014	90.78	94.42	71.12	75.97	9.22	5.58	73.75	79.40	49.53	55.79	22.86	30.57	63.56	68.43
Slovenia	2010–2014	53.90	66.44	22.24	36.22	46.10	33.56	29.55	38.89	20.45	33.33	5.03	12.22	26.95	34.00
South Africa	2010–2014	95.46	97.24	76.90	85.18	4.54	2.76	71.76	79.61	52.42	62.02	36.88	40.86	88.61	89.01
Spain	2010–2014	49.10	51.99	23.25	27.19	50.90	48.01	27.93	30.96	17.98	23.14	11.46	11.77	28.50	27.57
Sweden	2010–2014	28.31	31.71	7.75	13.75	71.69	68.29	14.60	17.51	6.94	11.38	1.36	3.87	13.55	14.72
Switzerland	2005–2009	54.69	57.63	25.38	28.79	45.31	42.37	23.55	17.02	31.68	27.57	6.24	12.90	27.05	36.10

Country	Period	GSNI (share of people with at least 1 bias)		GSNI2 (share of people with at least 2 biases)		Share of people with no bias		Share of people biased by dimension							
								Political		Economic		Educational		Physical integrity	
		% of women	% of men	% of women	% of men	% of women	% of men	% of women	% of men	% of women	% of men	% of women	% of men	% of women	% of men
Thailand	2010–2014	96.19	94.72	73.12	75.82	3.81	5.28	66.69	67.02	49.51	52.97	29.62	28.30	84.31	85.02
Trinidad and Tobago	2010–2014	84.49	87.80	45.26	58.54	15.51	12.20	35.22	43.90	31.02	45.90	4.20	7.32	71.90	72.51
Tunisia	2010–2014	93.17	99.21	73.73	93.38	6.83	0.79	67.25	88.49	68.30	89.27	17.16	31.07	78.28	88.80
Turkey	2010–2014	95.61	97.41	81.12	90.15	4.39	2.59	71.20	80.70	76.37	84.01	29.60	34.40	73.63	81.37
Ukraine	2010–2014	81.75	92.39	56.50	76.28	18.25	7.61	52.27	75.29	48.34	69.11	12.66	25.05	52.25	61.94
United Kingdom	2005–2009	48.86	60.92	20.59	30.90	51.14	39.08	21.56	30.99	19.17	31.61	4.41	9.10	28.19	32.68
United States	2010–2014	53.91	60.92	25.39	35.05	46.09	39.08	36.86	43.14	10.56	19.32	5.70	7.44	32.72	36.55
Uruguay	2010–2014	75.38	73.73	33.52	40.25	24.62	26.27	27.84	29.45	32.77	36.02	7.77	10.81	47.73	55.51
Uzbekistan	2010–2014	97.50	98.62	84.11	93.46	2.50	1.38	74.65	85.03	76.50	86.40	43.96	55.94	80.63	89.16
Viet Nam	2005–2009	93.06	92.72	67.64	70.63	6.94	7.28	57.14	61.54	59.70	65.14	20.74	20.00	71.55	69.63
Yemen	2010–2014	96.02	99.60	86.65	97.59	3.98	0.40	79.88	94.98	79.08	95.38	39.24	51.41	74.10	87.95
Zambia	2005–2009	95.23	98.41	75.07	85.92	4.77	1.59	60.03	71.90	47.57	63.06	20.00	26.97	87.23	90.86
Zimbabwe	2010–2014	99.56	99.48	80.85	89.47	0.44	0.52	74.09	83.04	46.23	70.54	11.91	21.32	95.37	97.33
Overall average^{a,b}	last available	86.09	90.58	62.36	73.02	13.91	9.42	53.03	64.01	49.68	63.18	22.41	28.68	69.71	74.09

NOTES

- a** Based on 75 countries with data from wave 5 (2005–2009) and wave 6 (2010–2014) of the World Values Survey, representing 81 percent of the global population.
- b** Averages for the global aggregate were calculated weighting for each country's 2015 population as published by UNDESA (2019).

DEFINITIONS

Gender Social Norms Index (GSNI): Percentage of people with at least one bias among seven indicators.

Gender Social Norms Index (GSNI2): Percentage of people with at least two biases among seven indicators.

MAIN DATA SOURCES

Columns 1–14: Mukhopadhyay, Rivera and Tapia (2019) based on data from the World Values Survey (Inglehart and others 2014).

Gender Social Norms Index (GSNI), trends

Country	GSNI (share of people with at least 1 bias)		GSNI2 (share of people with at least 2 biases)		Share of people with no bias		Share of people biased by dimension							
							Political		Economic		Educational		Physical integrity	
	2005–2009	2010–2014	2005–2009	2010–2014	2005–2009	2010–2014	2005–2009	2010–2014	2005–2009	2010–2014	2005–2009	2010–2014	2005–2009	2010–2014
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Argentina	76.66	75.41	42.22	42.49	23.34	24.59	34.65	43.35	37.48	30.43	14.34	17.04	56.75	52.86
Australia	52.23	46.24	27.20	23.00	47.77	53.76	32.37	32.48	26.05	18.06	7.35	4.09	26.05	20.93
Brazil	87.98	89.50	53.63	52.39	12.02	10.50	44.55	43.41	39.69	36.63	11.79	9.32	74.30	77.95
Chile	89.71	74.40	60.94	42.20	10.29	25.60	57.78	42.10	47.65	28.40	32.57	20.10	66.64	52.60
China	91.45	88.27	65.20	64.42	8.55	11.73	52.23	55.47	52.54	54.87	18.12	22.02	77.10	67.01
Cyprus	80.31	81.05	51.13	49.44	19.69	18.95	43.93	48.14	47.29	43.85	10.80	14.03	56.05	53.31
Georgia	92.73	94.09	78.93	77.12	7.27	5.91	66.47	65.89	78.73	66.97	23.33	18.14	57.13	74.63
Germany	59.11	62.60	31.13	33.07	40.89	37.40	26.43	26.59	26.94	30.91	14.32	15.78	39.90	44.68
Ghana	98.17	99.16	87.21	92.69	1.83	0.84	78.88	86.84	78.23	78.01	21.64	30.02	88.46	90.73
India	91.40	98.28	75.91	83.25	8.60	1.72	62.12	64.10	68.32	69.91	38.63	35.24	75.31	88.38
Japan	72.08	68.81	45.80	41.67	27.92	31.19	46.44	46.87	39.69	41.79	18.34	16.21	37.04	26.28
Jordan	99.55	99.33	96.98	95.67	0.45	0.67	84.75	91.17	94.95	89.42	36.29	28.75	94.92	81.50
Korea (Republic of)	86.60	87.07	65.54	62.91	13.40	12.93	64.36	63.68	60.51	54.33	29.35	25.67	54.87	58.27
Malaysia	98.17	98.54	87.42	88.38	1.83	1.46	82.75	79.69	70.02	74.54	46.08	43.00	90.84	94.31
Mexico	85.96	87.70	49.81	51.00	14.04	12.30	42.56	41.40	35.38	29.35	24.17	20.70	70.51	75.55
Morocco	95.00	96.25	77.42	80.58	5.00	3.75	65.25	69.00	69.00	72.50	28.33	19.58	85.67	82.50
Netherlands	52.45	39.75	22.47	15.88	47.55	60.25	24.72	21.29	23.32	13.56	5.32	4.63	28.95	22.03
Poland	80.91	79.75	50.36	47.31	19.09	20.25	46.48	43.74	42.92	41.99	14.28	11.91	56.26	53.02
Romania	83.45	85.50	60.42	60.84	16.55	14.50	52.36	48.78	58.00	55.88	17.12	20.69	59.68	63.54
Russian Federation	86.38	86.83	63.30	68.56	13.62	13.17	61.48	68.43	61.00	58.77	27.98	22.66	44.96	50.02
Rwanda	97.87	99.15	79.76	89.39	2.13	0.85	65.03	67.78	55.14	65.68	28.00	36.15	90.97	97.64
Slovenia	60.46	59.21	33.17	28.25	39.54	40.79	37.22	33.58	27.77	25.91	10.80	8.04	32.02	29.93
South Africa	93.32	96.32	71.69	80.90	6.68	3.68	61.33	75.56	55.22	57.06	19.98	38.80	81.04	88.80
Spain	51.40	50.50	25.39	25.16	48.60	49.50	30.09	29.40	27.73	20.48	12.62	11.61	28.05	28.05
Sweden	19.01	30.01	6.38	10.75	80.99	69.99	7.68	16.05	8.26	9.16	1.08	2.61	9.42	14.13
Thailand	97.98	95.47	81.29	74.50	2.02	4.53	74.12	67.30	57.82	50.86	27.44	29.02	85.79	84.53
Trinidad and Tobago	88.73	85.99	48.40	51.25	11.27	14.01	35.86	39.14	35.44	37.74	8.03	5.61	79.72	72.17
Turkey	93.84	96.52	77.57	85.70	6.16	3.48	65.67	76.02	70.77	80.25	19.46	32.04	75.25	77.56
Ukraine	87.28	86.53	64.58	65.40	12.72	13.47	60.60	62.63	58.18	57.69	32.47	18.23	50.80	56.61
United States	60.63	57.31	33.74	30.07	39.37	42.69	42.23	39.90	19.41	14.81	7.81	6.54	38.84	34.57
Uruguay	73.60	74.60	39.20	36.70	26.40	25.40	36.10	28.60	32.90	34.30	6.30	9.20	51.70	51.40
Overall average^{a,b}	86.46	87.28	63.55	65.38	13.54	12.72	54.24	56.20	53.43	53.82	24.26	24.19	68.71	69.40

NOTES

- a** Based on 31 countries with data from wave 5 (2005–2009) and wave 6 (2010–2014) of the World Values Survey, representing 59 percent of the global population.
- b** Averages for the global aggregate were calculated weighting for each country's 2015 population as published by UNDESA (2019).

DEFINITIONS

Gender Social Norms Index (GSNI): Percentage of people with at least one bias among seven indicators.

Gender Social Norms Index (GSNI2): Percentage of people with at least two biases among 7 indicators.

See table 2 in the main text for detailed definitions of the political, economic, educational and physical integrity dimensions.

MAIN DATA SOURCES

Columns 1–15: Mukhopadhyay, Rivera and Tapia (2019) based on data from the World Values Survey (Inglehart and others 2014).

Gender Social Norms Index (GSNI), trends by gender

Country	GSNI (share of people with at least 1 bias)				GSNI2 (share of people with at least 2 biases)				Share of people with no bias			
	2005–2009		2010–2014		2005–2009		2010–2014		2005–2009		2010–2014	
	% of women	% of men	% of women	% of men	% of women	% of men	% of women	% of men	% of women	% of men	% of women	% of men
Argentina	71.05	82.93	73.47	77.65	35.90	49.27	37.55	48.22	28.95	17.07	26.53	22.35
Australia	43.89	61.85	37.53	54.54	18.81	36.98	15.40	30.25	56.11	38.15	62.47	45.46
Brazil	87.10	88.94	88.89	90.16	49.20	58.49	46.49	58.86	12.90	11.06	11.11	9.84
Chile	87.80	91.82	69.43	79.51	52.95	69.76	32.94	51.72	12.20	8.18	30.57	20.49
China	89.59	93.24	84.65	91.78	59.93	70.26	59.07	69.60	10.41	6.76	15.35	8.22
Cyprus	76.39	85.09	77.18	85.01	41.85	62.02	41.87	57.17	23.61	14.91	22.82	14.99
Georgia	89.04	96.88	92.76	95.66	71.91	86.83	72.42	82.64	10.96	3.12	7.24	4.34
Germany	55.09	63.41	55.26	70.29	24.90	37.80	25.78	40.71	44.91	36.59	44.74	29.71
Ghana	96.83	99.48	98.92	99.39	80.08	94.19	88.77	96.54	3.17	0.52	1.08	0.61
India	87.69	94.28	97.09	99.21	66.43	83.11	77.14	88.03	12.31	5.72	2.91	0.79
Japan	68.52	76.60	64.93	72.98	40.78	52.17	37.68	45.96	31.48	23.40	35.07	27.02
Jordan	99.51	99.60	99.17	99.50	95.41	98.57	95.50	95.83	0.49	0.40	0.83	0.50
Korea (Republic of)	81.35	91.98	84.30	89.90	57.26	74.02	58.63	67.30	18.65	8.02	15.70	10.10
Malaysia	96.67	99.67	97.31	99.70	80.53	94.32	82.44	94.01	3.33	0.33	2.69	0.30
Mexico	87.64	84.22	88.21	87.19	47.92	51.76	49.25	52.75	12.36	15.78	11.79	12.81
Morocco	90.30	99.83	93.54	98.99	63.32	91.89	67.55	93.79	9.70	0.17	6.46	1.01
Netherlands	51.41	53.53	32.51	48.08	19.59	25.48	12.48	19.80	48.59	46.47	67.49	51.92
Poland	76.61	85.65	79.04	80.55	45.30	55.92	45.86	48.95	23.39	14.35	20.96	19.45
Romania	78.70	89.12	83.07	88.12	52.43	69.96	55.73	66.34	21.30	10.88	16.93	11.88
Russian Federation	82.22	91.40	82.63	91.94	53.12	75.58	61.45	77.22	17.78	8.60	17.37	8.06
Rwanda	96.98	98.79	99.22	99.08	74.51	85.16	89.22	89.56	3.02	1.21	0.78	0.92
Slovenia	57.66	63.69	53.90	66.44	29.73	37.14	22.24	36.22	42.34	36.31	46.10	33.56
South Africa	90.28	96.36	95.46	97.24	61.83	81.53	76.90	85.18	9.72	3.64	4.54	2.76
Spain	48.25	54.75	49.10	51.99	22.64	28.31	23.25	27.19	51.75	45.25	50.90	48.01
Sweden	17.80	20.21	28.31	31.71	5.71	7.05	7.75	13.75	82.20	79.79	71.69	68.29
Thailand	97.18	98.80	96.19	94.72	78.18	84.51	73.12	75.82	2.82	1.20	3.81	5.28
Trinidad and Tobago	86.71	90.74	84.49	87.80	42.33	54.47	45.26	58.54	13.29	9.26	15.51	12.20
Turkey	92.09	95.57	95.61	97.41	71.80	83.30	81.12	90.15	7.91	4.43	4.39	2.59
Ukraine	84.51	90.67	81.75	92.39	56.76	74.15	56.50	76.28	15.49	9.33	18.25	7.61
United States	54.55	66.94	53.91	60.92	28.25	39.44	25.39	35.05	45.45	33.06	46.09	39.08
Uruguay	74.10	72.97	75.38	73.73	36.69	42.34	33.52	40.25	25.90	27.03	24.62	26.27
Overall average^{a,b}	83.38	89.35	84.61	89.90	56.56	70.01	59.69	70.76	16.62	10.65	15.39	10.10

NOTES

- a Based on 31 countries with data from wave 5 (2005–2009) and wave 6 (2010–2014) of the World Values Survey, representing 59 percent of the global population.
- b Averages for the global aggregate were calculated weighting for each country's 2015 population as published by UNDESA (2019).

DEFINITIONS

Gender Social Norms Index (GSNI): Percentage of people with at least one bias among seven indicators.

Gender Social Norms Index (GSNI2): Percentage of people with at least two biases among 7 indicators.

MAIN DATA SOURCES

Columns 1–12: Mukhopadhyay, Rivera and Tapia (2019) based on data from the World Values Survey (Inglehart and others 2014).

Gender Inequality Index

	Gender Inequality Index		SDG 3.1 Maternal mortality ratio	SDG 3.7 Adolescent birth rate	SDG 5.5 Share of seats in parliament	SDG 4.6 Population with at least some secondary education		Labour force participation rate ^a	
	Value	Rank	(deaths per 100,000 live births)	(births per 1,000 women ages 15–19)	(% held by women)	(% ages 25 and older)		(% ages 15 and older)	
	2018	2018	2015	2015–2020 ^b	2018	Female	Male	Female	Male
HDI rank	2018	2018	2015	2015–2020 ^b	2018	2010–2018 ^c	2010–2018 ^c	2018	2018
VERY HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT									
1 Norway	0.044	5	5	5.1	41.4	96.1	94.8	60.2	66.7
2 Switzerland	0.037	1	5	2.8	29.3	96.4	97.2	62.6	74.1
3 Ireland	0.093	22	8	7.5	24.3	90.2 ^d	86.3 ^d	55.1	68.1
4 Germany	0.084	19	6	8.1	31.5	96.0	96.6	55.3	66.2
4 Hong Kong, China (SAR)	2.7	..	76.6	82.9	54.1	67.8
6 Australia	0.103	25	6	11.7	32.7	90.0	90.7	59.7	70.5
6 Iceland	0.057	9	3	6.3	38.1	100.0 ^e	100.0 ^e	72.1	80.6
8 Sweden	0.040	2	4	5.1	46.1	88.8	89.0	61.1	67.6
9 Singapore	0.065	11	10	3.5	23.0	76.3	83.3	60.5	76.3
10 Netherlands	0.041	4	7	3.8	35.6	86.6	90.1	58.0	68.9
11 Denmark	0.040	2	6	4.1	37.4	89.2	89.4	58.1	65.9
12 Finland	0.050	7	3	5.8	42.0	100.0	100.0	55.0	62.2
13 Canada	0.083	18	7	8.4	31.7	100.0 ^e	100.0 ^e	60.9	69.7
14 New Zealand	0.133	34	11	19.3	38.3	97.2	96.6	64.6	75.7
15 United Kingdom	0.119	27	9	13.4	28.9	82.9	85.7	57.1	67.8
15 United States	0.182	42	14	19.9	23.6	95.7	95.5	56.1	68.2
17 Belgium	0.045	6	7	4.7	41.4	82.6	87.1	47.9	58.9
18 Liechtenstein	12.0
19 Japan	0.099	23	5	3.8	13.7	95.2 ^d	92.2 ^d	51.4	70.7
20 Austria	0.073	14	4	7.3	34.8	100.0	100.0	54.8	65.9
21 Luxembourg	0.078	16	10	4.7	20.0	100.0	100.0	53.5	62.7
22 Israel	0.100	24	5	9.6	27.5	87.8	90.5	59.2	69.1
22 Korea (Republic of)	0.058	10	11	1.4	17.0	89.8	95.6	52.8	73.3
24 Slovenia	0.069	12	9	3.8	20.0	97.0	98.3	53.4	62.7
25 Spain	0.074	15	5	7.7	38.6	73.3	78.4	51.7	63.4
26 Czechia	0.137	35	4	12.0	20.3	99.8	99.8	52.4	68.4
26 France	0.051	8	8	4.7	35.7	81.0	86.3	50.3	60.0
28 Malta	0.195	44	9	12.9	11.9	74.3	82.2	43.3	66.2
29 Italy	0.069	12	4	5.2	35.6	75.6	83.0	40.0	58.4
30 Estonia	0.091	21	9	7.7	26.7	100.0 ^e	100.0 ^e	57.0	70.9
31 Cyprus	0.086	20	7	4.6	17.9	78.2	82.6	57.3	67.2
32 Greece	0.122	31	3	7.2	18.7	61.5	73.2	45.3	60.7
32 Poland	0.120	30	3	10.5	25.5	82.9	88.1	48.9	65.5
34 Lithuania	0.124	33	10	10.9	21.3	92.9	97.5	56.4	66.7
35 United Arab Emirates	0.113	26	6	6.5	22.5	78.8 ^d	65.7 ^d	51.2	93.4
36 Andorra	32.1	71.5	73.3
36 Saudi Arabia	0.224	49	12	7.3	19.9	67.8	75.5	23.4	79.2
36 Slovakia	0.190	43	6	25.7	20.0	99.1	100.0	52.7	67.4
39 Latvia	0.169	40	18	16.2	31.0	100.0 ^e	99.1 ^e	55.4	68.0
40 Portugal	0.081	17	10	8.4	34.8	53.6	54.8	53.9	64.2
41 Qatar	0.202	45	13	9.9	9.8	73.5	66.1	57.8	94.7
42 Chile	0.288	62	22	41.1	22.7	79.0	80.9	51.0	74.2
43 Brunei Darussalam	0.234	51	23	10.3	9.1	69.5 ^d	70.6 ^d	58.2	71.7
43 Hungary	0.258	56	17	24.0	12.6	96.3	98.2	48.3	65.0
45 Bahrain	0.207	47	15	13.4	18.8	64.2 ^d	57.5 ^d	44.5	87.3
46 Croatia	0.122	31	8	8.7	18.5	94.5	96.9	45.7	58.2
47 Oman	0.304	65	17	13.1	8.8	73.4	63.7	31.0	88.7
48 Argentina	0.354	77	52	62.8	39.5	66.5 ^d	63.3 ^d	49.0	72.8
49 Russian Federation	0.255	54	25	20.7	16.1	96.3	95.7	54.9	70.5
50 Belarus	0.119	27	4	14.5	33.1	87.2	92.5	58.1	70.3
50 Kazakhstan	0.203	46	12	29.8	22.1	98.3 ^d	98.9 ^d	65.2	77.1
52 Bulgaria	0.218	48	11	39.9	23.8	94.2	96.2	49.5	61.6
52 Montenegro	0.119	27	7	9.3	23.5	88.0	97.5	43.6	58.1
52 Romania	0.316	69	31	36.2	18.7	87.2	93.1	45.6	64.2
55 Palau	13.8	96.9	97.3
56 Barbados	0.256	55	27	33.6	27.5	94.6 ^d	91.9 ^d	61.9	69.6
57 Kuwait	0.245	53	4	8.2	3.1	56.8	49.3	57.5	85.3
57 Uruguay	0.275	59	15	58.7	22.3	57.8	54.0	55.8	73.8
59 Turkey	0.305	66	16	26.6	17.4	44.3	66.0	33.5	72.6
60 Bahamas	0.353	76	80	30.0	21.8	88.0	91.0	67.6	82.0

	SDG 3.1		SDG 3.7	SDG 5.5	SDG 4.6		Labour force participation rate*		
	Gender Inequality Index		Maternal mortality ratio	Adolescent birth rate	Share of seats in parliament	Population with at least some secondary education			
	Value	Rank	(deaths per 100,000 live births)	(births per 1,000 women ages 15–19)	(% held by women)	(% ages 25 and older)		(% ages 15 and older)	
HDI rank	2018	2018	2015	2015–2020 ^a	2018	2010–2018 ^c	2010–2018 ^c	2018	2018
61 Malaysia	0.274	58	40	13.4	15.8	79.8 ^d	81.8 ^d	50.9	77.4
62 Seychelles	62.1	21.2
HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT									
63 Serbia	0.161	37	17	14.7	34.4	85.7	93.6	46.8	62.1
63 Trinidad and Tobago	0.323	72	63	30.1	30.1	74.4 ^d	71.2 ^d	50.4	71.3
65 Iran (Islamic Republic of)	0.492	118	25	40.6	5.9	67.4	72.0	16.8	71.2
66 Mauritius	0.369	82	53	25.7	11.6	65.7 ^d	68.1 ^d	45.0	71.8
67 Panama	0.460	108	94	81.8	18.3	74.8 ^d	68.4 ^d	52.5	80.5
68 Costa Rica	0.285	61	25	53.5	45.6	53.8	52.3	45.7	74.6
69 Albania	0.234	51	29	19.6	27.9	93.5	92.8	47.2	64.9
70 Georgia	0.351	75	36	46.4	16.0	97.4	98.6	57.8	78.7
71 Sri Lanka	0.380	86	30	20.9	5.8	82.6 ^d	83.1 ^d	34.9	72.2
72 Cuba	0.312	67	39	51.6	53.2	86.7 ^d	88.9 ^d	40.0	67.4
73 Saint Kitts and Nevis	13.3
74 Antigua and Barbuda	42.8	31.4
75 Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.162	38	11	9.6	19.3	73.1	90.0	35.6	58.6
76 Mexico	0.334	74	38	60.4	48.4	58.4	61.1	43.8	78.9
77 Thailand	0.377	84	20	44.9	5.3	43.1	48.2	59.5	76.2
78 Grenada	27	29.2	39.3
79 Brazil	0.386	89	44	59.1	15.0	61.0	57.7	54.0	74.4
79 Colombia	0.411	94	64	66.7	19.0	53.1	50.9	58.6	82.0
81 Armenia	0.259	57	25	21.5	18.1	96.9	97.6	49.6	69.9
82 Algeria	0.443	100	140	10.1	21.3	39.1 ^d	38.9 ^d	14.9	67.4
82 North Macedonia	0.145	36	8	15.7	38.3	41.6 ^f	57.6 ^f	42.7	67.5
82 Peru	0.381	87	68	56.9	27.7	57.4	68.5	69.9	84.7
85 China	0.163	39	27	7.6	24.9	75.4 ^d	83.0 ^d	61.3	75.9
85 Ecuador	0.389	90	64	79.3	38.0	51.9	51.9	56.6	81.8
87 Azerbaijan	0.321	70	25	55.8	16.8	93.9	97.5	63.1	69.7
88 Ukraine	0.284	60	24	23.7	12.3	94.0 ^d	95.2 ^d	46.7	62.8
89 Dominican Republic	0.453	104	92	94.3	24.3	58.6	54.4	50.9	77.6
89 Saint Lucia	0.333	73	48	40.5	20.7	49.2	42.1	60.2	75.3
91 Tunisia	0.300	63	62	7.8	31.3	42.3 ^d	54.6 ^d	24.1	69.9
92 Mongolia	0.322	71	44	31.0	17.1	91.2	86.3	53.3	66.7
93 Lebanon	0.362	79	15	14.5	4.7	54.3 ^g	55.6 ^g	23.5	70.9
94 Botswana	0.464	111	129	46.1	9.5	89.6 ^d	90.3 ^d	66.2	78.6
94 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	45	49.0	13.0	57.3	79.2
96 Jamaica	0.405	93	89	52.8	19.0	69.9	62.4	60.4	73.9
96 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	0.458	106	95	85.3	22.2	71.7	66.6	47.7	77.1
98 Dominica	25.0
98 Fiji	0.357	78	30	49.4	19.6	78.3 ^d	70.2 ^d	38.1	76.1
98 Paraguay	0.482	117	132	70.5	16.0	47.3	48.3	56.9	84.1
98 Suriname	0.465	112	155	61.7	25.5	61.5	60.1	39.2	64.2
102 Jordan	0.469	113	58	25.9	15.4	82.0 ^d	85.9 ^d	14.1	64.0
103 Belize	0.391	91	28	68.5	11.1	78.9	78.4	53.3	81.4
104 Maldives	0.367	81	68	7.8	5.9	44.9 ^d	49.3 ^d	41.9	82.0
105 Tonga	0.418	96	124	14.7	7.4	94.0 ^d	93.4 ^d	45.3	74.1
106 Philippines	0.425	98	114	54.2	29.1	75.6 ^d	72.4 ^d	45.7	74.1
107 Moldova (Republic of)	0.228	50	23	22.4	22.8	95.5	97.4	38.9	45.6
108 Turkmenistan	42	24.4	24.8	52.8	78.2
108 Uzbekistan	0.303	64	36	23.8	16.4	99.9	99.9	53.4	78.0
110 Libya	0.172	41	9	5.8	16.0	69.4 ^d	45.0 ^d	25.7	79.0
111 Indonesia	0.451	103	126	47.4	19.8	44.5	53.2	52.2	82.0
111 Samoa	0.364	80	51	23.9	10.0	79.1 ^h	71.6 ^h	23.7	38.6
113 South Africa	0.422	97	138	67.9	41.8 ⁱ	75.0	78.2	48.9	62.6
114 Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	0.446	101	206	64.9	51.8	52.8	65.1	56.6	79.4
115 Gabon	0.534	128	291	96.2	17.4 ⁱ	65.6 ^d	49.8 ^d	43.4	60.2
116 Egypt	0.450	102	33	53.8	14.9	59.2 ^d	71.2 ^d	22.8	73.2
MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT									
117 Marshall Islands	9.1	91.6	92.5
118 Viet Nam	0.314	68	54	30.9	26.7	66.2 ^d	77.7 ^d	72.7	82.5
119 Palestine, State of	45	52.8	..	60.0	62.2	19.3	71.1

TABLE 4 GENDER INEQUALITY INDEX

HDI rank	Gender Inequality Index		SDG 3.1 Maternal mortality ratio	SDG 3.7 Adolescent birth rate	SDG 5.5 Share of seats in parliament	SDG 4.6 Population with at least some secondary education		Labour force participation rate ^a		
	Value	Rank	(deaths per 100,000 live births)	(births per 1,000 women ages 15–19)	(% held by women)	(% ages 25 and older)		(% ages 15 and older)		
	2018	2018	2015	2015–2020 ^b	2018	Female	Male	Female	Male	
120	Iraq	0.540	131	50	71.7	25.2	39.5 ^d	56.5 ^d	12.4	72.6
121	Morocco	0.492	118	121	31.0	18.4	29.0 ^d	35.6 ^d	21.4	70.4
122	Kyrgyzstan	0.381	87	76	32.8	19.2	98.6 ^d	98.3 ^d	48.0	75.8
123	Guyana	0.492	118	229	74.4	31.9	70.9 ^d	55.5 ^d	41.2	73.6
124	El Salvador	0.397	92	54	69.5	31.0	39.9	46.3	46.1	78.9
125	Tajikistan	0.377	84	32	57.1	20.0	98.8 ^d	87.0 ^d	27.8	59.7
126	Cabo Verde	0.372	83	42	73.8	20.8 ^k	28.7	31.2	65.1	73.2
126	Guatemala	0.492	118	88	70.9	12.7	38.4	37.2	41.1	85.0
126	Nicaragua	0.455	105	150	85.0	45.7	48.3 ^d	46.6 ^d	50.7	83.7
129	India	0.501	122	174	13.2	11.7	39.0 ^d	63.5 ^d	23.6	78.6
130	Namibia	0.460	108	265	63.6	39.7	40.5 ^d	41.9 ^d	56.2	65.9
131	Timor-Leste	215	33.8	33.8	25.0	52.6
132	Honduras	0.479	116	129	72.9	21.1	34.2	32.6	47.2	83.7
132	Kiribati	90	16.2	6.5
134	Bhutan	0.436	99	148	20.2	15.3	7.6	17.5	58.2	74.5
135	Bangladesh	0.536	129	176	83.0	20.3	45.3 ^d	49.2 ^d	36.0	81.3
135	Micronesia (Federated States of)	100	13.9	0.0 ^l
137	Sao Tome and Principe	0.547	136	156	94.6	14.5	31.5	45.8	43.3	76.2
138	Congo	0.579	145	442	112.2	14.0	46.7 ^d	51.3 ^d	66.9	71.6
138	Eswatini (Kingdom of)	0.579	145	389	76.7	12.1	31.3 ^d	33.9 ^d	41.4	65.9
140	Lao People's Democratic Republic	0.463	110	197	65.4	27.5	35.0 ^d	46.0 ^d	76.8	79.7
141	Vanuatu	78	49.4	0.0 ^l	61.5	79.6
142	Ghana	0.541	133	319	66.6	12.7	55.7 ^d	71.1 ^d	63.6	71.5
143	Zambia	0.540	131	224	120.1	18.0	39.2 ^d	52.4 ^d	70.8	79.8
144	Equatorial Guinea	342	155.6	18.0	55.2	67.1
145	Myanmar	0.458	106	178	28.5	10.2	28.7 ^d	22.3 ^d	47.7	77.3
146	Cambodia	0.474	114	161	50.2	19.3	15.1 ^d	28.1 ^d	75.2	87.6
147	Kenya	0.545	134	510	75.1	23.3	29.8 ^d	37.3 ^d	63.6	69.1
147	Nepal	0.476	115	258	65.1	33.5	29.0 ^d	44.2 ^d	81.7	84.4
149	Angola	0.578	144	477	150.5	30.5	23.1	38.1	75.4	80.1
150	Cameroon	0.566	140	596	105.8	29.3	32.7	40.9	71.2	81.4
150	Zimbabwe	0.525	126	443	86.1	34.3	55.9	66.3	78.6	89.0
152	Pakistan	0.547	136	178	38.8	20.0	26.7	47.3	23.9	81.5
153	Solomon Islands	114	78.0	2.0	62.4	80.3
LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT										
154	Syrian Arab Republic	0.547	136	68	38.6	13.2	37.1 ^d	43.4 ^d	12.0	70.3
155	Papua New Guinea	0.740	161	215	52.7	0.0 ^l	9.9 ^d	15.2 ^d	46.0	47.6
156	Comoros	335	65.4	6.1	37.4	50.7
157	Rwanda	0.412	95	290	39.1	55.7	12.9 ^d	17.9 ^d	84.2	83.6
158	Nigeria	814	107.3	5.8	50.6	59.8
159	Tanzania (United Republic of)	0.539	130	398	118.4	37.2	11.9 ^d	16.9 ^d	79.4	87.2
159	Uganda	0.531	127	343	118.8	34.3	27.4 ^d	34.7 ^d	67.2	75.0
161	Mauritania	0.620	150	602	71.0	20.3	12.7 ^d	24.9 ^d	29.2	63.2
162	Madagascar	353	109.6	19.6	83.6	89.3
163	Benin	0.613	148	405	86.1	7.2	18.2 ^d	33.6 ^d	69.2	73.3
164	Lesotho	0.546	135	487	92.7	22.7	32.8 ^d	25.1 ^d	59.8	74.9
165	Côte d'Ivoire	0.657	157	645	117.6	9.2 ^m	17.8 ^d	34.1 ^d	48.3	66.0
166	Senegal	0.523	125	315	72.7	41.8	11.1	21.4	35.2	58.6
167	Togo	0.566	140	368	89.1	17.6	27.6 ^d	54.0 ^d	76.1	79.3
168	Sudan	0.560	139	311	64.0	31.0	15.3 ^d	19.6 ^d	24.5	70.3
169	Haiti	0.620	150	359	51.7	2.7	26.9 ^d	39.9 ^d	63.3	72.8
170	Afghanistan	0.575	143	396	69.0	27.4 ⁱ	13.2 ^d	36.9 ^d	48.7	82.1
171	Djibouti	229	18.8	26.2	54.8	71.1
172	Malawi	0.615	149	634	132.7	16.7	17.6 ^d	25.9 ^d	72.9	82.0
173	Ethiopia	0.508	123	353	66.7	37.3	11.5 ⁿ	22.0 ⁿ	74.2	86.5
174	Gambia	0.620	150	706	78.2	10.3	30.7 ⁿ	43.6 ⁿ	51.7	67.7
174	Guinea	679	135.3	21.9	64.1	65.1
176	Liberia	0.651	155	725	136.0	11.7	18.5 ^d	39.6 ^d	54.7	57.5
177	Yemen	0.834	162	385	60.4	0.5	19.9 ^d	35.5 ^d	6.0	70.8
178	Guinea-Bissau	549	104.8	13.7	67.3	78.9
179	Congo (Democratic Republic of the)	0.655	156	693	124.2	8.2	36.7	65.8	60.8	66.5

	Gender Inequality Index		SDG 3.1 Maternal mortality ratio	SDG 3.7 Adolescent birth rate	SDG 5.5 Share of seats in parliament	SDG 4.6 Population with at least some secondary education		Labour force participation rate*	
	Value	Rank	(deaths per 100,000 live births)	(births per 1,000 women ages 15–19)	(% held by women)	(% ages 25 and older)		(% ages 15 and older)	
			2015	2015–2020 ^a		2018	Female	Male	Female
HDI rank	2018	2018	2015	2015–2020 ^a	2018	2010–2018 ^e	2010–2018 ^e	2018	2018
180 Mozambique	0.569	142	489	148.6	39.6	14.0	27.3	77.5	79.6
181 Sierra Leone	0.644	153	1,360	112.8	12.3	19.9 ^d	32.9 ^d	57.7	58.5
182 Burkina Faso	0.612	147	371	104.3	11.0	6.0 ⁿ	12.1 ⁿ	58.5	75.1
182 Eritrea	501	52.6	22.0	74.1	87.1
184 Mali	0.676	158	587	169.1	8.8	7.3 ^f	16.4 ^f	61.3	80.9
185 Burundi	0.520	124	712	55.6	38.8	7.5 ^d	11.0 ^d	80.4	77.6
186 South Sudan	789	62.0	26.6	71.8	74.3
187 Chad	0.701	160	856	161.1	15.3	1.7 ⁿ	10.3 ⁿ	64.8	77.9
188 Central African Republic	0.682	159	882	129.1	8.6	13.4 ^d	31.1 ^d	64.7	79.8
189 Niger	0.647	154	553	186.5	17.0	4.3 ^d	8.9 ^d	67.3	90.5
OTHER COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES									
.. Korea (Democratic People's Rep. of)	82	0.3	16.3	74.3	87.3
.. Monaco	33.3
.. Nauru	10.5
.. San Marino	26.7
.. Somalia	732	100.1	24.3	19.1	74.3
.. Tuvalu	6.7
Human development groups									
Very high human development	0.175	—	15	16.7	27.2	87.0	88.7	52.1	69.0
High human development	0.331	—	56	33.6	24.4	68.9	74.5	53.9	75.6
Medium human development	0.501	—	198	34.3	20.8	39.5	58.7	32.3	78.9
Low human development	0.590	—	557	101.1	21.3	17.8	30.3	58.2	73.1
Developing countries	0.466	—	231	46.8	22.4	55.0	65.8	46.6	76.6
Regions									
Arab States	0.531	—	148	46.6	18.3	45.9	54.9	20.4	73.8
East Asia and the Pacific	0.310	—	62	22.0	20.3	68.8	76.2	59.7	77.0
Europe and Central Asia	0.276	—	25	27.8	21.2	78.1	85.8	45.2	70.1
Latin America and the Caribbean	0.383	—	68	63.2	31.0	59.7	59.3	51.8	77.2
South Asia	0.510	—	176	26.1	17.1	39.9	60.8	25.9	78.8
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.573	—	550	104.7	23.5	28.8	39.8	63.5	72.9
Least developed countries	0.561	—	434 ^T	94.4	22.5	25.3	34.9	57.3	78.8
Small island developing states	0.453	—	192	57.5	24.6	59.0	61.5	51.0	70.2
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development	0.182	—	14	20.5	30.1	84.8	87.7	51.6	68.5
World	0.439	—	216^T	42.9	24.1	62.8	71.2	48.0	74.9

NOTES

- a** Estimates modelled by the International Labour Organization.
- b** Data are average annual estimates for 2015–2020.
- c** Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified.
- d** Based on Barro and Lee (2018).
- e** Based on data from OECD (2018).
- f** Updated by HDRO based on data from United Nations Children's Fund Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys for 2006–2018.
- g** Based on cross-country regression.
- h** Based on data from the national statistical office.
- i** Excludes the 36 special rotating delegates appointed on an ad hoc basis.

j Refers to 2017.

k Refers to 2013.

l In calculating the Gender Inequality Index, a value of 0.1 percent was used.

m Refers to 2015.

n Updated by HDRO based on data from ICF Macro Demographic and Health Surveys for 2006–2018.

T From original data source.

DEFINITIONS

Gender Inequality Index: A composite measure reflecting inequality in achievement between women and men in three dimensions: reproductive health, empowerment and the labour market. See *Technical note 4* at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2019_technical_notes.pdf for details on how the Gender Inequality Index is calculated.

Maternal mortality ratio: Number of deaths due to pregnancy-related causes per 100,000 live births.

Adolescent birth rate: Number of births to women ages 15–19 per 1,000 women ages 15–19.

Share of seats in parliament: Proportion of seats held by women in the national parliament expressed as a percentage of total seats. For countries with a bicameral legislative system, the share of seats is calculated based on both houses.

Population with at least some secondary education: Percentage of the population ages 25 and older that has reached (but not necessarily completed) a secondary level of education.

Labour force participation rate: Proportion of the working-age population (ages 15 and older) that engages in the labour market, either by working or

actively looking for work, expressed as a percentage of the working-age population.

MAIN DATA SOURCES

Column 1: HDRO calculations based on data in columns 3–9.

Column 2: Calculated based on data in column 1.

Column 3: UN Maternal Mortality Estimation Group (2017).

Column 4: UNDESA (2019b).

Column 5: IPU (2019).

Columns 6 and 7: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2019) and Barro and Lee (2018).

Columns 8 and 9: ILO (2019).



*Empowered lives.
Resilient nations.*